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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction for the above captioned matter is conferred
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-2A-3(2)(c).
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a
Municipal Corporation,

Case No. 90100-CA

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Appeal Priority 2

vs.
WILFORD L. MCCULLOUGH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY
Appeal from the Third Circuit Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Grant,
presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Wilford L. McCullough, was issued a citation on
October 27, 1989, for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Defendant thereafter moved to suppress results of the Intoxilyzer
test on the basis that the arresting officer lacked specific
articulable facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe
defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. The
motion was denied, and defendant entered a conditional plea of
guilty, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on
the suppression motion.
ISSUE
Did the arresting officer have an articulable suspicion that
defendant had committed or was about to commit crime?

-

i

-

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellate court "will not disturb the trial court's
factual evaluation underlying its decision to grant or deny a
motion to suppress unless it is clearly erroneous."
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

State v.

See also State

v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson, 771
P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Further, "[t]he trial

court's finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against the
clear weight of the evidence or [the appellate court] reach[es] a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

OFFICER WILLIAMS' STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS A
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE ENCOUNTER, INASMUCH AS THE
OFFICER HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT ONE OR MORE
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED.

II.

DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT ALSO PROVIDED THE OFFICER WITH A
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING WHILE
IMPAIRED.
FACTS

1.

On October 27, 1989, at 12:50 a.m., Wilford McCullough

was stopped at a red light at the intersection of 200 West and
900 South in Salt Lake City.
2.

(T.5,6).

When the light changed to green, Mr. McCullough failed

to proceed through the intersection for approximately 30 seconds.
(T.6)
3.

Officer Williams, Salt Lake City Police Department,

observed the failure to proceed.

(T.5)
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4.

Because the officer had probable cause to believe that

a traffic violation had occurred and because the officer had a
reasonable suspicion that McCullough may have been impaired,
McCullough was stopped.
5.

(T.6,10,11).

It was the officer's testimony that he had previously

stopped motorists for such a violation.
6.

(T.10,11).

Defense counsel specifically stated at the motion

hearing he was not arguing that this was a pretextual stop.
(T.27).

ARGUMENTS
I.

OFFICER WILLIAMS' STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS A
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE ENCOUNTER, INASMUCH AS THE
OFFICER HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT ONE OR MORE
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED.

The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged three categories of
constitutionally permissible encounters between police officers
and the public:
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic]
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not
detained against his will; (2) an officer has an
'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed
or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause
to believe an offense has been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting
United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)).
See also State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).

- ^ -

"A stop which results from an officer actually observing a
citizen commit a traffic violation would involve the officer
having, at the least, probable cause to believe the citizen had
committed a traffic offense.

Thus, under the Deitman analysis,

it would involve a level three stop." State v. Smith, 119 Utah
Adv. Rep. 83, fn.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), citing United States v.
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cit. 1984) (setting out the three
levels of police encounters).
As previously indicated, defendant does not claim this to be
a pretextual stop, but that he did not violate* a traffic
ordinance. (Trial Transcript at 27, hereinafter, T.27).

Thus,

this court need not reach the issue of whether Officer Williams
had reasonable suspicion of a greater crime, i.e., DUI.

(See

State v. Smith, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. at 85), but only whether he
had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-104 requires vehicles stopping on a two way
road to do so at the right hand curb.

Defendant did not do so.

Salt Lake City Code §12.36.030 , prohibits driving "a motor
vehicle at such slow speed as to impede or block the normal and
reasonable movement of traffic..."
A.2d 388 (Me. 1988).

See also State v. Seavey, 564

Stopping for 30 seconds at a green light is

a sufficiently slow speed as to impede traffic.
2
Code §12.56.050 , requires continuous movement.

Salt Lake City
Defendant's

movement was obviously not continuous.
Adopted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §46-6-17, and consistent
with §§46-6-23, 46-6-49, 46-6-103.
2

!d.
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Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989)
is distinguishable, inasmuch as the officer in Thorsness did not
have probable cause to believe there was a violation of the
traffic law.

Rather, this case is governed by Smith, supra.

Officer Williams had probable cause to believe defendant violated
a traffic law.
Whether the defendant actually would be found guilty of such
a violation is, of course, not the point:
The court's rulings ... illustrate the difference in
standards and latitude allowed in passing upon the distinct
issues of probable cause and guilt. Guilt in a criminal
case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt ... However,
if those standards were to be made applicable in determining
probable cause for arrest or for search and seizure ... few
indeed would be the situations in which an officer, charged
with protecting the public interest in enforcing the law,
could take effective action toward that end.
State v. Richards, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 33 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Also see, State v. Bartley, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 42 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989):

"In establishing probable cause, we deal not in

certainties, but in 'probabilities.'

The quantum of evidence

needed for probable cause is significantly less than that needed
to prove guilt.

(Citations omitted).

This analysis has been confirmed by other states.

In

McConnell v. State, 374 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. App. 1988), a police
officer stopped the defendant for failure to dim his headlight.
He noticed signs of impairment; defendant's blood alcohol level
was shown to be .17. The defendant was acquitted of failure to
dim headlights but convicted of DUI. On appeal defendant argued
that since he was acquitted of failure to dim headlights, the

- R -

arresting officer had no probable cause to believe that he had
committed an offense.

The Georgia court held that the officer's

reasonable belief that an offense had been committed, though he
may have been mistaken either as to fact to law, was yet a
sufficient "founding suspicion" to enable the trial court to
determine the stop was not mere arbitrariness or harassment.

The

stop was not lacking in reasonable cause or articulable suspicion
and appellant was thus not entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal for lack of probable cause to stop.

McConnell, 374

S.E.2d 111, 113.

II.

DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT ALSO PROVIDED THE OFFICER WITH A
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING WHILE
IMPAIRED.

Assuming, arguendo, that defendant's actions did not
establish probable cause to believe there was a violation of the
law, Thorsness is still distinguishable, as defendant
McCullough's conduct in this case provided reasonable suspicion.
The Thorsness court found that defendant's driving slowly past an
accident at 1:30 a.m. and failing to move on "immediately" when
directed to was not sufficient to establish a. reasonable
suspicion of driving while impaired.

While there is nothing

"inherently untoward in a driver traveling under the speed limit
or in stopping momentarily" at an accident (Thorsness, at 29),
Mr. McCullough was not proceeding past an accident.
nothing to attract his attention.

There was

Noting the standard of review,

the trial court in the instant case agreed that it is unusual for
a car, with the engine running, to wait a full 30 seconds at a

- 6 -

green light.

This is far past the "honk the horn and make him

go" time period.
That there may be other possible explanations for
defendant's failure to proceed is not the issue.

The City is not

required to eliminate any conceivable explanation of the conduct,
but only demonstrate "an articulable suspicion" that the person
has committed a crime.

See State v. Menke, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 32

(Utah Ct. App. 1990):

"Defendant's actions, although conceivably

consistent with innocent-albeit highly eccentric-activity, are
also strongly indicative of shoplifting, especially in such close
proximity to a shopping mall.

It was reasonable for the officers

to investigate the suspicious activity they observed."
Adv. Rep. 32, 34.

128 Utah

It was eminently reasonable for Officer

Williams to investigate the specific articulable facts presented
to him:

Defendant's failure to proceed through a green light for

a lengthy period of time during the early morning hours.

CONCLUSION
Officer Williams had probable cause to believe defendant
violated one or more traffic laws by failing to proceed through
the light. Additionally, this conduct provided a reasonable
suspicion that defendant was impaired, either through fatigue or
substance abuse.

The trial court's determination should be

affirmed.
DATED this Zo

day of May, 1990.

AJ^A

L /
GLEN A. COOK,
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
- 7 -

ADDENDUM
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12.56.050

CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT REQUIRED.

When signs or traffic markings are erected or placed by the
direction of the city, no person shall stop, stand or park a
vehicle or permit said vehicle to remain standing at any
time, with the exception or certain hours specified, upon
any street, parts of a street, or roadway.
12.36.030

DRIVING TOO SLOW.

No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such slow speed as
to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of
traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe
operation or to comply with law.

41-6-16

MOTOR VEHICLES

41-6-16.

Uniform application of chapter — Effect of local ordinances.
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and
uniform throughout this state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority
m a y not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in
conflict with the provisions of this chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent
with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances
which are not in conflict with this chapter.
1987
41-6-17.

Regulatory p o w e r s of local authorities
— Traffic-control d e v i c e affecting state

highway — Necessity of erecting traffic-control devices.
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent
local authorities, with respect to highways under
their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise
of police power, from:
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking;
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or official traffic-control devices;
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways;
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for use by traffic moving in one direction
under Section 41-6-60;
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in
public parks, which supersede Section 41-6-48 regarding speed limits;
(f) designating any highway as a through
highway or designating any intersection or junction of roadways as a stop or yield intersection or
junction;
(g) restricting the use of highways under Section 27-12-145;
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration and inspection of them,
including requiring a registration fee;
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or specified types of vehicles;
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under
Section 41-6-48;
(k) requiring written accident reports under
Section 41-6-42;
ft) designating no-passing zones under Section
41-6-59;
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of controlled-access roadways by any class or kind of
traffic under Section 41-6-65;
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily
traveled streets by any class or kind of traffic
found to be incompatible with the normal and
safe movement rof traffic;
(o) establishing minimum speed limits under
Subsection 41-6-49(3);
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play
streets;
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a
highway in a business district or any designated
highway except in a crosswalk under Section
41-6-77;
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings at unmarked crosswalks under Section 41-6-82.10;
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts;
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters,
sleds, skateboards, and other toy vehicles;
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary or experimental ordinances as necessary to cover
emergencies or special conditions;

550

(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from exceeding maximum speed limits;
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specifically authorized by this chapter.
(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain
any official traffic-control device at any location
which requires the traffic on any state highway to
stop before entering or crossing any intersecting
highway unless approval in writing has first been
obtained from the Department of Transportation.
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d),
(e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (1), (m), (n), (p), or (r) is not effective
until official traffic-control devices giving notice of
the local traffic ordinances are erected upon or at the
entrances to t h e highway or part of it affected as is
appropriate.
1997

41-6-17.5. Private roads and parking areas.
(1) (a) Any municipality or county may by ordinance provide that privately-owned and maintained roads or parking areas within the city or
county, as described in the ordinance, are subject
to this chapter, provided:
(i) the roads or parking areas are generally held open for use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel or parking to serve
commercial establishments;
(ii) the privately-owned and maintained
road is so connected with a highway that the
public would not reasonably be able to determine that it is a privately-owned and maintained road; or
(iii) a majority of the owners of the privately owned and maintained road have
signed a petition and submitted it to the municipality or county, requesting that the road
be included in an ordinance enacted under
this section.
(b) An ordinance may not be enacted under
this subsection without a public hearing and
without the agreement of the owner of the privately-owned and maintained highway or parking area involved.
(2) The department is not required under this section to patrol or enforce any provisions of this chapter
on any privately-owned and maintained road or parking area, b u t is required to enforce those provisions of
this chapter applicable to private property other t h a n
under this section.
1S68
41-6-18.

Right of real property o w n e r to regulate traffic.
This chapter does not prevent the owner of real
property used by t h e public for purposes of vehicular
travel by permission of the owner and not as matter
of right from prohibiting the use, or from requiring
other or different or additional conditions other t h a n
those specified in this chapter, or otherwise regulating the use a s preferred by the owner, except as may
be required under Section 41-6-17.5.
1988
41-6-19.

R e m o v a l of plants or other obstructions impairing v i e w — Notice to
o w n e r — Penalty.

(1) The owner of real property shall remove from
his property any tree, plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part of it, which, by obstructing the view of
any operator, constitutes a traffic hazard.
(2) When the Department of Transportation or any
local authority determines upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that a traffic hazard
exists, it shall notify the owner and order that the
hazard be removed within ten days.

MOTOR VEHICLES
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(3) The failure of the owner to remove the traffic
hazard within ten days is a class C misdemeanor.
1907

41-6-19.10.

Repealed.

1979

ARTICLE 3
TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS A N D MARKINGS
41-6-20.

Manual and specifications for uniform
system of traffic-control devices.

(1) The Transportation Commission shall adopt a
manual and specifications for a uniform system of
traffic-control devices consistent with the provisions
of this chapter for use upon highways within this
state. The manual shall correlate with and where
possible conform to the system set forth in the most
recent revised edition of the "Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways"
and other standards issued or endorsed by the Federal Highway Administrator.
(2) The Transportation Commission shall adopt a
manual and specifications for a uniform system of
traffic-control devices for school crossing zones, which
shall supplement P a r t VII of the manual adopted under Subsection (1).
1987
41-6-21.

P l a c i n g and m a i n t e n a n c e u p o n state
h i g h w a y s — Restrictions o n local authorities.

(1) The Department of Transportation shall place
and maintain traffic-control devices in conformance
with its manual and specifications upon all state
highways as it finds necessary to indicate and to
carry out the provisions of this chapter or to regulate,
warn, or guide traffic.
(2) A local authority may not place or maintain
any traffic-control device upon any highway under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation
except by t h e latter^s permission.
1987
41-6-22.

P l a c i n g and maintenance u p o n local
h i g h w a y s b y local authorities.
Local authorities, in their respective jurisdictions,
shall place and maintain official traffic-control devices upon highways under their jurisdiction as they
find necessary to indicate and to carry out t h e provisions of this chapter or local traffic ordinances, or to
regulate, warn, or guide traffic. All traffic-control devices erected under this section shall conform to and
be maintained in conformance with the Department
of Transportation manual and specifications for a
uniform system of traffic-control devices under Section 41-6-20.
1987
41-6-23.

Obeying devices — Effect of improper
position, illegibility, or a b s e n c e — Pres u m p t i o n of lawful placement and
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h chapter.

(1) The operator of a vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-control device placed or
held in accordance with this chapter unless at the
time otherwise directed by a peace officer, and subject
to the exceptions granted the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle.
(2) (a) Any provision of this chapter, for which official traffic-control devices are required, may not
be enforced against an alleged violator if at the
time and place of the alleged violation an official
device is not in proper position and sufficiently
legible to be seen by an ordinarily observant person.

41-6-24

(b) When a particular section does not state
that official traffic-control devices are required,
the section is effective even though no devices
are erected or in place.
(3) When official traffic-control devices are placed
or held in a position approximately conforming to the
requirements of this chapter, the devices are presumed to have been placed or held by the official act
or direction of lawful authority, unless the contrary is
established by competent evidence.
(4) An official traffic-control device placed or held
under this chapter and purporting to conform to the
lawful requirements pertaining to t h a t device is presumed to comply with the requirements of this chapter, unless t h e contrary is established by competent
evidence.
1987
41-6-24. Traffic-control signal — At intersections — At p l a c e other t h a n intersection — Color o f light signal.

(1) When traffic is controlled by a traffic-control
signal exhibiting different colored lights, or color
lighted arrows, successively one at a time or in combination, only the colors green, red, and yellow may be
used, except for special pedestrian signals carrying a
word legend. The lights shall indicate and apply to
operators of vehicles and pedestrians as provided in
this section.
(2) "Green" indicates:
(a) Veliicular traffic facing a circular green
signal may proceed straight through or turn
right or left unless a sign at that place prohibits
either turn. But the vehicular traffic, including
vehicles turning right or left, shall yield the
right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians
lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent
crosswalk at the time the signal is exhibited.
(b) Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow signal shown alone or in combination with other
indication, may cautiously enter the intersection
only to make the movement indicated by the
arrow or other movement as is permitted by
other indications shown at the same time. The
vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to
pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic lawfully using the intersection.
(c) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestriancontrol signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians
facing any green signal except when the sole
green signal is a turn arrow may proceed across
the roadway within any marked or unmarked
crosswalk.
(3) Steady "Yellow" indicates:
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular
yellow or yellow arrow signal'is warned that the
"Red" signal will be exhibited next.
(b) Pedestrians facing a steady circular yellow
or yellow arrow signal, unless otherwise directed
by a pedestrian-control signal under Section
41-6-25 are advised that there is insufficient time
to cross the roadway before a red indication is
shown, and no pedestrian may then start to cross
the roadway.
(4) Steady "Red" indicates:
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal
alone shall stop before entering the intersection
at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before
entering the crosswalk on the near side of the
intersection and shall remain stopped until an
indication to proceed is shown, except as provided
in Subsection (4)(c).

41-6-49

MOTOR VEHICLES

investigation the prima facie speed for all highways
under their respective jurisdictions and shall declare
a reasonable and safe prima facie limit, which may be
different than the prima facie speed permitted under
this chapter for an urban district. ' *
(3) Any limit altered under this section is effective
when appropriate signs giving notice are erected
upon the highway.
(4) The Department of Transportation determines
prima facie evidence of a lawful speed on state highways whether the highways are within or without the
corporate limits of any city.
1987
41-6-49.

Minimum speed regulations.

(1) A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a
speed so slow as to impede or block the normal and
reasonable movement of traffic except when:
(a) reduced speed is necessary for safe operation;
(b) upon a grade; or
(c) in compliance with official traffic control
devices.
(2) Operating a motor vehicle on a controlled access highway at less than the lawful maximum speed
side by side with and at the same speed as a vehicle
operated in the adjacent right lane constitutes evidence of impeding or blocking normal movement of
traffic.
(3) When the Department of Transportation or local authorities within their respective jurisdictions
determine on the basis of an engineering and traffic
investigation that slow speeds on any part of a highway consistently impede the normal and reasonable
movement of traffic, the Department of Transportation or local authority may determine and shall post a
minimum speed limit below which no person may operate a vehicle except when necessary for safe operation.
1967
41-6-50.

Special s p e e d limit o n bridges — Prima

facie evidence.
( D A person may not operate a vehicle over any
bridge or other elevated structure which is a part of a
highway at a speed which is greater than the maximum speed which may be maintained with safety on
the bridge or structure, when the structure is
signposted under this section.
(2) The Department of Transportation upon request from any local authority shall, or upon its own
initiative, may conduct an investigation of any bridge
or other elevated structure which is a part of a highway. If it finds the structure may not with safety
withstand vehicles traveling at the speed otherwise
permissible under this chapter, the Department of
Transportation shall determine the maximum speed
of vehicles which, the structure can withstand, and
shall cause or permit suitable signs stating the maximum speed to be erected and maintained before each
end of the structure.
(3) Upon the trial of a person charged with a violation of this section, proof of the determination of the
maximum speed by the Department of Transportation and the existence of the signs constitute conclusive evidence of the maximum speed which may be
maintained with safety on the bridge or structure.
1967

41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway
— Barricade or obstruction.
(1) A person may not engage** any motor vehicle
speed contest or exhibition of speed on a highway or
aid or abet in any motor vehicle speed contest or exhibition on any highway.
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(2) A person may not, for the purpose of facilitating
or aiding or as an incident to any motor vehicle speed
contest upon a highway, in any manner obstruct or
place any barricade or obstruction or assist or participate in placing any barricade or obstruction upon any
highway.

1987

41-6-52. Speed violation — Complaint — Civil
negligence.
(1) In every charge of violation of any speed provision of this article, the complaint and the summons or
notice to appear shall specify the speed at which the
defendant is alleged to have operated a vehicle, also
the prima facie speed applicable within the district or
at the location.
(2) The provisions of this article declaring prima
facie speed limitations do not relieve the plaintiff in
any civil action from the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as the proximate
cause of an accident.
vm
41-6-52.1. Repealed.

it»

ARTICLE 7
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING
ON RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY,
OVERTAKING, PASSING AND
OTHER RULES OF THE
ROAD
41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side of
roadway — Exceptions.
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle
shall be operated upon the right half of the roadway,
except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the
rules governing that movement;
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the
vehicle to the left of the center of the roadway,
but the operator shall yield the right-of-way to
all vehicles traveling in the proper direction
upon the unobstructed portions of the highway
within a distance constituting an immediate hazard;
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked
lanes for traffic under the applicable rules; or
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for
one-way traffic.
(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding at less
than the normal speed of traffic under the existing
conditions shall be operated in the right-hand lane
then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to
the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except
when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a
left turn at an intersection or into a private road or
driveway.
i987
41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions.
Operators of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to t h e right. On roadways
having width for not more t h a n one line of traffic in
each direction, each operator shall give to the other a t
least one-half of t h e main traveled portion of the
roadway as nearly a s possible.
1987
41-6-55.

Overtaking and p a s s i n g vehicles proc e e d i n g in s a m e direction.
The overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding

,41-6-101
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transportation of school children, shall bear upon
the front and rear of the bus a plainly visible sign
containing the words "school bus" in letters not
less than eight inches in height, which shall be
removed or covered when the vehicle is not in use
for the transportation of school children.
(b) Every school bus, when operated for the
transportation of school children, shall be
equipped with alternating flashing amber and
red light signals visible from the front and rear,
of a type approved and mounted ,as prescribed by
the department.
(2) The operator of any vehicle upon a highway,
upon meeting or overtaking any school bus equipped
with signals required imder this section which is displaying alternating flashing amber warning light
signals, shall slow his vehicle, but may proceed past
the school bus using due care and caution at a speed
not greater than specified in Subsection 41-6-46(2) for
school zones for the safety of the school children that
may be in the vicinity. If a school bus is displaying
alternating flashing red light signals visible from the
front or rear, all approaching or overtaking vehicles
on the same roadway shall stop immediately before
reaching the bus and may not proceed until the flashing red light signals cease operation. The operator of
a vehicle need not stop upon meeting or passing a
school bus traveling in the opposite direction when:
(a) traveling upon a divided highway;
(b) the bus is stopped at an intersection or
other place controlled by an official traffic-control device or peace officer; or
(c) upon a highway of five or more lanes,
which may include a left-turn lane or two-way
left turn lane.
(3) (a) The operator of a school bus shall operate
alternating flashing red light signals a t all times
when children are unloading from a school bus to
cross a highway, or when a school bus is stopped
for the purpose of loading children who must
cross a highway to board the bus, or a t any other
time when it would be hazardous for vehicles to
proceed past the stopped school bus.
(b) The alternating flashing red light signals
may not be operated except when the school bus
is stopped for loading or unloading school children or for any emergency purpose.
1967
ARTICLE 14
STOPPING, STANDING A N D PARKING
41-6-101.

Stopping or parking o n r o a d w a y out*

side business or residential district.
Outside a business or residence district no person
shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle,
whether attended or unattended, upon the roadway
when it is practical to stop, park, or so leave such
vehicle off the roadway, but in every event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing
vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle shall be
available from a distance of 200 feet in each direction
upon such roadway.
This section and Sections 41-6-103 and 41-6-104
shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is
disabled while on the paved or main traveled portion
of a roadway in such manner and to such extent that
it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily
leaving such disabled vehicle in such position.
1978
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41-6-102. Police officer authorized to move vehicle.
(1) Whenever any police officer finds a vehicle in
violation of Section 41-6-101 such officer is hereby
authorized to move such vehicle, or require the driver
or other person in charge of the vehicle to move the
same, to a position off the roadway.
(2) Any kpo lice officer is authorized to remove or
cause to be removed to a place of safety any unattended vehicle illegally left standing upon any highway, bridge, causeway or in any tunnel in such position or under such circumstances as to obstruct the
normal movement of traffic.
(3) Any police officer is authorized to remove or
cause to be removed to the nearest garage or other
place of safety any vehicle found upon a highway
when:
(a) Report has been made that such vehicle
has been stolen or taken without the consent of
its owner, or
(b) The person or persons in charge of such vehicle are unable to provide for its custody or removal, or
(c) When t h e person driving or in control of
such vehicle is arrested for an alleged offense for
which t h e officer is required by law to take the
person arrested before a proper magistrate without unnecessary delay.
1978
41-6-103.

S t a n d i n g or parking vehicles — Restrictions and exceptions.
Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other
traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of
a police officer or official traffic-control device, no person shall:

(1) Stop, stand or park a vehicle:
(a) on the roadway side of any vehicle
stopj^ed or parked at the edge or curb of a
street;
(b) on a sidewalk;
(c) within an intersection;
(d) on a crosswalk;
(e) between a safety zone and the adjacent
curb or within 30 feet of points on the curb
immediately opposite the ends of a safety
zone, unless a different length is indicated by
signs or markings;
(f> alongside or opposite any street excavation or obstruction when stopping, standing,
or parking would obstruct traffic;
(g;) upon any bridge or other elevated
structure upon a highway or within a highway tunnel;
(h) on any railroad tracks;
(i) on any controlled-access highway,
0*) in the area between roadways of a divided highway, including crossovers;
(k) any place where official traffic-control
devices prohibit stopping.
(2) Stand or park a vehicle, whether occupied
or not, except momentarily to pick up or discharge a passenger or passengers:
(a) in front of a public or private driveway;
(lb) within 15 feet of a fire hydrant;
(c) within 20 feet of a crosswalk at an intersection;
(d) within 30 feet upon the approach to
any flashing signal, stop sign, yield sign or
traffic-control signal located at the side of a
roadway;
(e) within 20 feet of the driveway entrance
to any fire station and on the side of a street
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opposite the entrance to any fire station
within 75 feet of said entrance when properly signposted;
(f) at any place where official traffic-con6
trol devices prohibit standing.
(3) Park a vehicle, whether occupied or not,
except temporarily for the purpose of and while
actually engaged in loading or unloading property or passengers:
(a) within 50 feet of the nearest rail of a
railroad crossing;
(b) at any place where official traffic-control devices prohibit parking.
(4) No person shall move a vehicle not lawfully
under such person's control into any prohibited
area or an unlawful distance from the curb. 1978
41-6-104. Stopping or parking upon roadways
— Angle parking — Traffic-control devices prohibiting or restricting.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section,
every vehicle stopped or parked upon a two-way roadway shall be stopped or parked with the right-hand
wheels parallel to and within twelve inches of the
right-hand curb or as close as practicable to the right
edge of the right-hand shoulder.
(2) Except when otherwise provided by local ordinance, every vehicle stopped or parked upon a oneway roadway shall be stopped or parked parallel to
the curb or edge of the roadway in the direction of
authorized traffic movement with its right-hand
wheels within twelve inches of the right-hand curb or
as close as practicable to the right edge of the righthand shoulder or with its left-hand wheels within
twelve inches of the left-hand curb or as close as practicable to the left edge of the left-hand shoulder.
(3) Local authorities may by ordinance permit angle parking on any roadway, except that angle parking shall not be permitted on any federal-aid or state
highway unless the Department of Transportation
has determined that the roadway is of sufficient
width to permit angle parking without interfering
with the free movement of traffic.
(4) The Department of Transportation with respect
to highways under its jurisdiction may place trafficcontrol devices prohibiting or restricting the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles on any highway
where in its opinion such stopping, standing, or parking is dangerous to those using the highway or where
the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles would
unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic.
No person shall stop, stand, or park any vehicle in
violation of the restriction indicated by such devices.
1978

ARTICLE 15
MISCELLANEOUS RULES
41-6-105.

Motor vehicle left unattended — Requirements.
No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle
shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing
the key, placing the transmission in "park" or the
gears in "low" or "reverse" if the vehicle has a manual shift, or effectively setting the brakes thereon;
and, when standing upon any perceptible grade, turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highly.
1969
41-6-106.

B a c k i n g — When permissible.

41-6-107.6

(a) The driver of a vehicle shall not back the same
unless such movement can be made with safety and
without interfering with other traffic.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall not back the same
upon any shoulder or roadway of any limited-access
roadway.
1975
41-6-106.10. S i d e w a l k — Driving prohibited —
Exception.
No person shall drive any vehicle upon a sidewalk
or sidewalk area except upon a permanent or duly
authorized or temporary driveway.
1975
41-6-107.

Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle —

Place for operator to ride — Passengers.
(a) A person operating a motorcycle or motordriven cycle shall ride only upon the permanent and
regular seat attached thereto and such operator shall
not carry any other person nor shall any other person
ride on a motorcycle or a motor-driven cycle unless
such vehicle is designed to carry more than one person, in which event a passenger may ride upon the
permanent and regular seat, if designed for two persons, or upon another seat firmly attached to the motorcycle or motor-driven cycle at the rear or side of
the operator.
(b) A person shall ride upon a motorcycle or motordriven cycle only while sitting astride the seat, facing
forward, with one leg on either side of the motorcycle
or motor-driven cycle.
(c) No person shall operate a motorcycle or motordriven cycle while carrying any package, bundle, or
other article which prevents him from keeping both
hands on the handlebars.
(d) No operator shall carry any person, nor shall
any person ride, in a position t h a t will interfere with
the operation or control of the motorcycle or motordriven cycle or the view of t h e operator.
1969
41-6-107.2. Motorcycles, motor-driven cycles, or
all-terrain t y p e I vehicles — Operation

on public highways.
(1) All motorcycles and motor-driven cycles are entitled to full use of a lane and no motor vehicle may
be driven in a manner so as to deprive any motorcycle
or motor-driven cycle of the full use of a lane. This
subsection does not apply to motorcycles or motordriven cycles operated two abreast in a single lane.
(2) The operator of a motorcycle or motor-driven
cycle may not overtake and pass in the same lane
occupied by the vehicle being overtaken.
(3) No person may operate a motorcycle or motordriven cycle between lanes of traffic, or between adjacent lines or rows of vehicles.
(4) Motorcycles or motor-driven', cycles may not be
operated more than two abreast in a single lane.
(5) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to police
officers in the performance of their official duties.
(6) The provisions of this section also apply to allterrain type I vehicles.
1987
41-6-107.4. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle —
Attaching t o another vehicle prohibited.
No person riding upon a motorcycle or motordriven cycle shall attach himself to any other vehicle
on a roadway.
1969
41-6-107.6. M o t o r ^ c l e or motor-driven cycle —
Footrests' for p a s s e n g e r — Height of
handlebars limited.

(a) Any motorcycle or motor-driven vehicle carry-
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